



PALGRAVE STUDIES IN GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP
EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY

AFRICAN DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION REVISITED

Edited by
Yusef Waghid and Nuraan Davids



OCEAN



Yusef Waghid • Nuraan Davids
Editors

African Democratic Citizenship Education Revisited

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On the [Im]possibility of Democratic Citizenship Education in Kenya: Spheres of Change

Jane Adhiambo Chiroma

Introduction

Violence in Kenya undermines the role of Kenyan higher education towards transitioning to democratic practices. This chapter engages liberal deliberative democracy concepts to explore the relationship between citizenship education and ethnic violence to re-imagine democratic citizenship education (DCE) in Kenyan higher education. First, it examines the notion that higher education can be a process and a place where citizenship education can be cultivated to potentially overcome ethnic violence, gender violence and discrimination which are prevalent in Kenyan society and education (Boit and Kipkoech 2012; Johnson 2013; Sifuna 2006). Secondly, the chapter analyses a notion of DCE within the liberal tradition, which potentially describes DCE as a process of public engagement, which can create a sense of belonging necessary for human interaction. I will show that liberal DCE, as practised and experienced in Kenya, is thin and is already employed

J.A. Chiroma (✉)

Jos ECWA Theological Seminary, Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria

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in conceptualising policies in Kenyan education system, yet the anomalies and imbalances in Kenyan society still exist. Thirdly, I will argue that Kenyan higher education system and policy provides potential meanings for DCE; however, it is limited, since education is engendered in a preconceived sense of belonging which is already actualised (Misaro et al. 2013). Fourth, I claim that DCE in becoming as an extension of a liberal idea of potentiality can address the challenges Kenya faces.

I use deconstruction as a method to think differently about the possibilities and impossibilities of DCE in Kenya. In this vein I extend the liberal view of DCE to DCE in becoming. Doing this is based on the premise that liberal DCE has a potential that can be extended to the possibilities of DCE in becoming for the feasibility of the future. In this vein, DCE in becoming will be examined for potentialities and impossibilities for citizenship education in Kenya, which is hoped potentially can address ethnic violence, nepotism ethnocentrism and other societal ills in the Kenyan society in whatever singularity and contribute to the sphere of change.

I will then show how DCE in becoming potentially can be used to inform higher education in Kenya in whatever singularity for the possibility to address issues of belonging, interaction and public reasonableness. DCE in becoming will engender speech and thought in making judgement without rash. In addition, this chapter will demonstrate that DCE in becoming potentially can enable students and teachers (citizens) to learn to think for themselves in their privation and respect others with whom they co-belong. This chapter hopes to contribute to a defensible conception of DCE that potentially can address the anomalies, imbalances and ambiguities of DCE currently found in Kenya. The potentialities of DCE in becoming are explored so that the possibilities of cultivating responsible, relational, emancipative individual agency to becoming humans who respect and co-belong to the coming community—that which embraces DCE in becoming.

Conceptions of Liberal Democratic Citizenship Education: A Minimalist View

This section analyses the notion of DCE within the liberal tradition (Benhabib 2011; Habermas 1987a, b; Rawls 1971)—the liberal tradition refers to the deliberative connotations such as democratic iteration as

found in Benhabib, communicative rationality by Habermas and public reason as found in Rawls and how such understandings construct education for democratic citizenship respectively. This conceptual analysis for DCE within liberal tradition is fundamental in unlocking DCE as a process of public engagement, which creates a sense of belonging for human interaction. Liberal views on DCE suggest that communication can be instrumental to realising equality and reaching an agreement about public concerns among citizens (Benhabib 1996, 2011; Dewey 1916; Habermas 1987a, b; Rawls 1971). Communication is conceptualised by the liberal thinking as a core vocabulary for realising learning objectives in democratic education and enhances participative learning experiences.

Rawls's (1971) theory of justice, from the perspective of moral philosophy, incorporates justice in communities. For such justice to be experienced, Rawls suggests an egalitarian notion of justice as fairness by using two guiding principles—the principle of greatest equal liberty and the principle of equality of opportunity and difference. The principle of equal liberty exemplifies the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for the conception of good that are envisioned in an egalitarian society. Consequently, this can enable people to think critically and reasonably when making ethical judgements in relation to what he argues for in justice as fairness in the original position of equality for all. These moral capacities allow individuals to have the disposition to make rational and reasonable judgements and to choose the right thing to do (Freeman 2003: 5). This moral ability, in turn, depicts the reciprocal act of appreciation and respect for others as expression of democratic citizenry in display of a good life. The second principle of justice is that of equality of opportunity and difference which states that, '[s]ocial and economic inequalities are arranged so that they a) reasonably expected to be everyone's advantage, and b) attached to positions and offices open to all' (Rawls 1971: 61). This principle applies to wealth and income and to the design of organisations that utilise differences in authority and responsibility, or chains of command. Rawls notes that the distribution of wealth and income need not be equal, but must be to everyone's advantage (Rawls 1971: 61). At the same time, positions of authority and offices must be accessible to all. This second principle

can be harnessed by keeping a position open and yet subject to this constraint, which arranges social and economic inequalities so that everyone benefits.

Rawls (1971) elucidates that justice requires democratic equality which encourages deliberation, reciprocity and mutual self-respect among citizens within the public sphere. Rawls's theory is plausible in its departure from the traditional perception of justice that does not reflect on human interaction, sense of belonging and engagement as a collective concern for society's responsibility.

Habermas (1987a, b) constructs a theory of communication for a democratic action that enables understanding and consensus in public deliberation [education]. In his communicative theory, Habermas sheds light on democratic deliberation as a necessity for the equality of citizens and for the opportunities they have to voice their thoughts and contribute to their own learning and of public concern. Habermas's theory has historical links that encourage discourses within contextual histories to disrupt modern notions of democratic education. As such, he offers a theory of communicative action to emancipate rationality and reflexivity for meaning making in education theory, policy and practice. This assumption of Habermas requires a reciprocal 'ear' of listening actively to what is being communicated and being able to act communicatively, rather than being passive. This process requires clear, critical and logical communication that leads to understanding. At the same time, it requires a reciprocal action of listening, hearing and response—leading to understanding—so that citizens can communicate with each other in order to act appropriately.

The concept of communicative rationality refers to the collaboration of two or more competent speakers and actors who can initiate interpersonal relations (Habermas 1987b: 86). These actors pursue an understanding of the particular situation; they do this by negotiating with one another by way of providing valid reasons in order to reach an agreement. Important to this is the interpretation of the central concept of action. The negotiations that take place during this process are crucial because they will determine the model in which a consensus is determined. Habermas maintains that this process gives language a prominent role. In keeping with Habermas's notion (1987b: 4), Pusey (1987: 70) affirms

that Habermas's intention with the theory of communicative action is to develop 'a model that will show how rationality manifests in ordinary social interaction, communication between speaking and acting subjects'.

Habermas (1987a) is of the opinion that only teleological concepts developed in the tradition of Mead, Garfinkel, Parson and Durkheim offer spaces for a concept of rationality of action. This means that communicative action is understood on the assumption that language as a medium of speech can be used to show how people relate to and reflect on the world in which they live (Habermas 1987b: 94). He notes that communicative action presupposes language as a medium of unconstrained communication, whereby speakers and listeners alike can interpret and understand one another in the context of their reinterpreted life world. This refers simultaneously to things in their objective, social and subjective world in order to negotiate common definitions of the situation.

Given the centrality of communicative action, Habermas's proposition for communicative rationality addresses the concern of how language has the ability to coordinate action in a consensual and cooperative way, as opposed to one that is forced or manipulated (Chiroma 2016: 36). In other words, Habermas posits how the use of language in contexts of interaction could produce mutual agreement on a course of action. Therefore, the capacity to force agreement can be shown in the possibility of acting communicatively. Habermas (1987a) is not concerned with how arguments are conducted to rationally assess claims of truth or of rightness. He is concerned with the realistic presumptions that competent speakers and actors make in trying to reach agreement on disputed claims with others. He considers as communicative action 'those linguistically mediated interactions in which all participants pursue illocutionary aims, and only illocutionary aims, with their mediating acts of communication' (Habermas 1987a: 19). Conversely, he regards as linguistically mediated strategic action those interactions in which at least one of the participants wants to produce perlocutionary effects with his speech that will influence understanding of the illocutionary acts.

What Habermas suggests above can assist in developing education policy and other public concerns that require stakeholder agreement; for

instance, policies that will reflect the voices of all involved in structuring education. The voices of students should be reflected in particular, as they are often forgotten in policy deliberations. Democratic equality in communication depicts substantive types of human relationships and creates a sense of belonging (Anderson et al. 1997; Habermas 1987a, b; Yuval-Davis 2011). It depicts an understanding of one's self [identity] in relation to the other—community. Communication is a channel that can help students to understand the world around them in order to participate in shaping education for the society to which they belong.

DCE needs to be conceptualised in such a way that the content students learn is depicted in a language that will aid better communication. For students to reach an understanding within learning communities there is a need to learn both the dispositions of communication and the ability to communicate. Education as a social practice can be achieved when participants adopt an attitude oriented to reaching understanding and not only success (Habermas 1987a: 286). In this manner, understanding is regarded as the mechanism for coordinating actions (Habermas 1987a: 287).

Communicative action explicates how reasonableness can be a value for conceptualising DCE. The ability to provide reasons and the disposition to assess and evaluate reasons in pedagogical encounters and in educational planning and management can improve understanding in education for democratic citizenry. Habermas asserts that the clarity of rationality claims differs depending on their organisational features. The claim of true statements and rightness of action requires validation, to which claims to truthfulness are not subject. Habermas indicates that this communication process requires that participants be free to raise and challenge claims without fear of coercion, intimidation and deceit, and to have equal chances to speak, make assertions, express themselves and make logical argument to challenge others. This process of communication must be relevant to the problem at hand and must provide valid reasons, as well as having an open mind to accepting criticism. In essence, DCE in Habermasian perspective 'ought' to be configured as a communicative process that engenders universities as communities and public places that require deliberative rationality, cultural compliance and understanding through constructive consensus.

Habermas overlooks some members of polity that may not be eloquent in speech; this weakens the argument on inclusion. Young asserts that inclusion especially when it is geared towards those who are capable in critical engagement may exclude others. Inclusion for Young 'entails political equality, where all members of the polity are included in the decision-making process and have an equal opportunity to influence the outcome' (Young 2003: 52). Young (2003) adds to the above and recognises that even though some might not be as eloquent as others, opportunities should be provided for such voices to be heard by allowing these citizens to participate in ways that may not be rational. She notes that narrative—that is, listening to the stories or experiences of others—might provide ample data for logical collection that could contribute to deliberations. Young (2003) also suggests that rhetoric can be used to provoke or awaken voices that might otherwise be excluded from conventional conversations. Another way she suggests that might create or trigger a conversation is greeting—a symbolic recognition of others, of recognising their presence. Young's articulation is timely in including those who might not, in normal circumstances, include themselves or who do not participate in public discussions. It counters Habermas's view that rationality is the only way to include others in the discussion of matters of public concern, like education.

Chiroma (2016: 41) argues that it is insufficient to perceive education in terms of rational practice or procedural justice. She observes that Rawls's and Habermas's views help to develop a sense of deliberative democracy using rationality, communication and justice; these are not enough to address the educational pursuit. Education as a social practice cannot be considered or limited to rational practice only, without the notion of a cultural practice. The conceptualisation of public deliberation can be enriched with culture as an essential element that influences education. However, drawing from culture alone, as Habermas partially suggests, is not enough, because it can become an emotive practice. In this regard, Benhabib's iterative and cosmopolitan thinking comprehensively acknowledges Habermas, while at the same time extending it by emphasising that education should engender community by recognising people as human beings with right-holding virtues. Rawls (1971) shows how respect and reciprocity exemplify democratic communication in

egalitarian fairness. Communication is one way in which education enables equal participation by stakeholders in their roles in teaching and learning.

Benhabib's democratic iteration, it can be argued, offers a corresponding argument to Rawls's and Habermas's deliberative democracy in relation to the public sphere. Even though Benhabib takes a different position from that of Rawls and Habermas, she advances what I think is the need to complement what is absent in Rawls's and Habermas's formulation, as discussed previously. Rawls's procedure of justice as fairness is limited to constructing laws and constitutions for institutions; however, the egalitarian principles he suggests may act as one of the facets in creating a community sense of belonging and enhancing public rationality. However, creating a sense of belonging might exclude some and favour others. The procedures involved indicate that those involved in this process must have the capacity to follow procedures and the ability to offer rationality towards law-making. These procedures are elaborate and might include others, while at the same time excluding some. On the other hand, Habermas's communicative rationality assumes that an ideal speech situation is enough to create a sense of belonging, and includes public rationality.

Communicative rationality single-handedly is inadequate for conceptualising human interaction, sense of belonging, and public engagement, since not everyone has the capacity to engage in public deliberation unless they are taught to do so. It is difficult to show how ideas agreed upon are enacted in cases where consensus is not reached. However, Habermas seeks to include all voices by the way people offer reasons and reach agreement, yet this seems impossible. It assumes a uniform way of thinking that does not depict the nature of public communication. Both Rawls and Habermas maintain that an agreement be reached. This supposes that all humans have the same patterns in attaining agreement. It does not represent differing views that might mar agreement.

Benhabib, on the other hand, advances justice as fairness and communicative rationality with the idea of the human right to have rights. She differs from Rawls and Habermas in that there is a possibility that people may not reach agreement; in this case, respect and reciprocity play a

major role in appreciating the differences, and are a way of acknowledging the rights of others in a reciprocal manner to our own rights. She notes that reaching agreement is not mandatory to creating a sense of belonging, advancing human interaction and improving public engagement. Benhabib acknowledges various voices and generates her ideas from a starting point at which others stop, hence expounding a sense of belonging within the social position of cosmopolitanism and the rights of others.

Benhabib's democratic iteration takes the philosophical position of social constructivism to that of normative political theory. It also considers cultures as clearly delineable wholes and provides an analysis that generates coherence and purpose (Benhabib 2011:75, 141). Benhabib's theory contends that, to be and to become a self, is to insert oneself into webs of interlocution and recognise the self in relation to others. She also acknowledges a cosmopolitan sense of belonging, because state borders have become porous, so thinking of citizenship education beyond the borders of our local society imagines justice for all humanity. She recognises an understanding of the public sphere as the space in which identities and affiliations are negotiated. In addition to these, she provides a deliberative model of democracy, and highlights egalitarian reciprocity, voluntary self-ascription and freedom as an exit to constructing democracy (Benhabib 1996: 69; 2011).

Benhabib's (2011) publication 'Dignity in Adversity: Human Rights in Troubled Times', embarks upon democratic iteration on the issue of the 'right to have rights'. Democratic iteration refers 'to continuing conversations, a complex dialogue, which challenges the assumption of completeness of each culture by making it possible for its members to look at themselves from the perspectives of others' (Benhabib 2011:76). Benhabib (2011) draws on 'Unity and diversity of human rights' from Husserl's project of a transcendental phenomenology in western culture to build upon democratic iteration. She considers Husserl's answer to the question of universalism to be an essentialist one. This she accomplished by interpreting words used by Husserl in relation to ongoing events, including their actuality and potentiality. Benhabib describes Husserl's position that other cultures certainly deserve respect for their achievements, however inferior they may be to western culture that is characterised by

philosophy, science, a life of theorising and the essence of scrutiny (Benhabib 2011: 59). Benhabib illuminates that Husserl's universalism was characterised by egalitarianism and fascism in Europe where he lived. Benhabib develops her argument on this basis and indicates that '[a]s the globe grows together materially into one world, it becomes all the more urgent to understand how claims to universality can be reconciled with assertions of religious and cultural difference; how the unity of reason can be reconciled with the diversity of life-forms' (Benhabib 2011: 59). She further notes that, due to globalisation, the search for universalism is articulated in the context of 'human rights language', and the defence of institutionalisation has become uncontested language. She points out that this language and the trend of human rights have not yet become a reality in human global politics. Based on this, Benhabib (2011) argues that there is a fundamental human right, 'the right to have rights'—that is, every human being is to be recognised by others, and to recognise others in turn, as persons entitled to moral respect and legally protected human rights.

Benhabib (2011) maintains that human rights articulate moral principles that protect the communicative freedom of individuals and itemise legal rights as supportive assertions. She reiterates Michael Walzer, who claims that human rights constitute the '[c]ore of universal thin morality', and Nussbaum (1997: 273–300), who declares that human rights form '[r]easonable conditions of a world-political consensus'. Chiroma (2016) observes Benhabib's agreement with Nussbaum on the political overlapping, and disagreement with narrow perceptions of philosophical anthropology on human capabilities. On the other hand Benhabib points out that Rawls (1971: 529–552) cautions for the need to differentiate between the list of human rights included in the law of peoples and that are defensible from the standpoint of a global public reason and the universal declaration of human rights in 1948 (Benhabib 2011: 60). The work contends that Rawls's position on human rights is provocative because it valorises the human rights to life, to liberty, to personal property and to formal equality, as expressed by the rules of natural justice. In relation to Charles Beitz (2001: 272, cited in Benhabib 2011: 87), Benhabib acknowledges his contribution to rights requiring democratic political forms, religious tolera-

tion, legal equality for women and a free choice of partner, which in many circumstances may certainly be excluded. Benhabib (2011: 87) argues that 'human rights embody moral principles which need contextualisation and specification in the form of legal norms'.

In this regard, Benhabib is of the opinion that human rights need to shift both the justification strategy and the derivation of the content of human rights away from a minimalist concern towards a more robust understanding of human rights in terms of the 'right to have rights'—a notion she claims is borrowed from Arendt's political stand, but she uses it as the claim of each human being to be recognised as moral and being worthy of equal concerns and equally entitled to be protected as a legal personality by his or her own polity, as well as by the world community. In other words, Benhabib valorises both individual (private) and community (public) rights in engendering the human right to have rights in communicative freedom. She differs here from both Rawls's and Habermas's starting points. I see Benhabib's moral philosophy as lying between the traditional individualistic notions for her claim of the private and Habermas's and Rawls's conception of community to explain the relation of the individual to the public sphere. Thus, Benhabib strikes a balance by explaining a human being first as situating the self (private) in relation to others (public). I find her idea to be robust because of the respect she has for the right of an individual, yet she also recognises the public.

Benhabib's approach is seen as a crucial starting point that can help in re-imagining citizenship education. The generative and iterative argumentation and philosophical pathways used in constructing ideas from the theory of transcendental phenomenology to interactive universalism provide articulated coherency and weight, as they validate the authority on which she bases her argument. The reflexivity and iteration of the concept of rights gives authority to educational concerns. Chiroma (2016: 46) affirms that the arguments that Benhabib raises regarding human rights have implications for pedagogy and can ensure universal justice for all. Education engendered within sound morals and values that regards respect for one another in a reciprocal way seeks to improve educational theory and praxis. It is important that certain utopias, such as

the one Benhabib suggests, be considered in decision-making and in the way we rethink morals and values in education, as a starting point to developing meaning in education. Accordingly, Benhabib suggests that citizenship education needs to be conceptualised in such a way that it counters the threats posed by the dystopias (ills, inequalities, discrimination, ethnic prejudices and the like) in society. Doing this will enable us to foster healthier societies that respect and are aware of the value of human life, rights and the consequences of said abuses. Consequently, Benhabib (2011) may be inferring that citizenship education needs to uphold the equality of all beings, no matter their class, the amount of knowledge they may have acquired, their religious background, ethnic origin or culture. Therefore, in Benhabib's line of reasoning, citizenship education should be able to reflect on how the unity of reason can be determined in relation to the diversity of life-forms and the recognition of human agency.

Benhabib (1996, 2011) illustrates how recognising humanity whenever it occurs can accelerate the process of communicative freedom and advance the capacity for individuals to consciously respect each other in a reciprocal manner. Recognising humanity whenever it occurs has important implications for educational experiences in higher education. Communication in a democratic sense has potentialities to improve governance and access and to promote culture in higher education. Democratic communication can advance egalitarian social relations, human interaction and a sense of belonging. Communicative democracy has a tendency to promote a culture of sympathy and caring in education (Noddings 2006; Nussbaum 1997; Waghid 2007).

This section explored the different threads of liberal thought on DCE. Rawls's theory of justice illustrates how public reason enables people to interact, engage with and locate themselves in relation to others—a question of cultivating a community of public reasoners. Habermas's communicative action expounds how communicative rationality can liberate individuals' capacity to participate in public decision-making. Habermas shows how language, cognition and inclusion can create understanding and a sense of belonging. Benhabib's democratic iteration clarifies how recognising individual rights enables individuals to participate in iteration on cosmopolitan debates and find their voices in global discussions.

[Im]possibility of Democratic Citizenship Education in Kenya

Higher education policy documents in Kenya are silent about issues of DCE and more silent about recognition of diversity as an important facet of a just education system. If higher education is so mute on the relevance of its education society, then it seems improbable for such educational policy document to address real societal concerns. Certainly, the question can be posed if this is the mission of higher education. Not necessarily, 'but if the conditions are not conducive to higher learning then policies would not mean much. I am not suggesting that higher education is a panacea (cure) for societal dilemmas such as violence. But for higher education to unfold openly and freely conditions will have to be in place to effect higher education.' Therefore, I argue that Kenya higher education system and policy provides space for DCE, however, in a limited form, since education is engendered in preconceived sense of belonging and is actualised (Misaro et al. 2013).

Higher education policy documents examined (see for instance Republic of Kenya 1964, 1976, 1981, 1999, 2007, 2012a, b) suggest that Kenyan government recommends liberal democratic education for its citizens. Policies are considered crucial to guide theory and practice of education in Kenya. Various policies on education were examined; one of the current policies guiding education in Kenya recommends democratic education. For instance, University Act No. 42 of 2012 which is a supplement Act in the Kenyan Gazette (Republic of Kenya 2012b) described democratic notions with particular preconceived objectives such as promoting inclusion; promotion of equality of persons with disability, minorities and other marginalised groups; realisation of national economic and social development, promote highest standards in quality of teaching and research, fostering the capacity for critical thinking and promoting gender balance and equality, promoting cultural and social life of society and promotion of learning among student and society at large (Republic of Kenya 2012b). From these objectives flows the content of curriculum which is planned to attain these outcomes.

But the reality of Kenyan life does not suggest that the kinds of objectives envisaged by these policies are being realised. A clue to this apparent contradiction lies in the language of achievement which saturates most education policy and curricula. Education policies and curricula are conceptualised to attain a democratic society with particular democratic outcomes; yet these remain unattained. In so doing, it closes off and suffocates the educational encounters that could yield the unexpected. Policy trends in Kenya are conceived in an actualised mode, these actualised conditions, silences other voices, thereby already closing opportunities for learning beyond borders. This perhaps contributes to the violence Kenyans experience sporadically.

Education in Kenya is designed to promote equality; cultural and social life of society, realisation of national and economic development (Republic of Kenya 1981, 1976, 2012a, b: 83; 1965) yet ethnic, economic and political experiences (see Diepeveen 2010; Klopp 2002: 269–290; Ogude 2002: 202–207; Omolo 2002: 209; Atieno-Odhiambo 2002: 223–249; Wawire et al. 2008: 1) deter the degree to which Kenyans can enjoy their rights and responsibilities as full citizens. This is demonstrated in the rate of unemployed youth, ethnic violence (Alwy and Schech 2004: 266; Diepeveen 2010; Nyakuri 1997:1), political violence (Ajulu 2002; Alwy and Schech 2004: 266; Nyakuri 1997; Ogude 2002; Omolo 2002; Oyugi 2000; Otieno and Munene 2007; Atieno-Odhiambo 2002; Wawire et al. 2008) and the neglect of the voice of young people which, if addressed, can potentially advance citizenship education in Kenya. Kenyan citizenship is characterised by undemocratic happenstance; next, I will show the challenges Kenya faces.

Violence in Kenya undermines the role of higher education as a hub for democratic citizenry. Violence in Kenya has taken many dimensions. Evident in Kenyan higher education are student riots that have resulted in violence, academic disruption and the temporary closure of universities in Kenya (Chege 1998: 9; Tunbridge 1997: 37a). The major causes of such violence among university students have been identified to be protests against legislation to hike tuition fees, and the tightening of the collection of student loans, which the government originally gave as grants and was implemented by a board that students considered corrupt (Chege 1998: 44). This escalated into violent disruptions in which students

were dispersed by paramilitary police using tear gas and clubs to remove students from the university premises, and some were left dead and others injured (Chege 1998; Tunbridge 1997). In addition, ethnic violence has led to the instability of higher education institutions as well as cultivated societal hatred and division among so-called citizens (Broch-Due 2005: 6; Johnson 2013: 329). Johnson (2013) notes that the 2007 post-election violence over the contested election results contributed immensely to conflicts and division within Kenya's public universities. At the heart of the conflict, students, faculty and staff turned against one another and impaired their sense of belonging (relationships) and the ability of higher education institutions in Kenya to contribute to national development as part of a national agenda for the institutions. In this regard, universities had to change their internal policies to deal with such conflict situations in order for peace-building (Johnson 2013). Ethnicity has been used to explain violence in Africa, yet the complexity of the violence is related to identities formed around gender, generation, locality, class, religion, nationality and difference, rather than the universal mask of ethnicity as the core cause of violence (Broch-Due 2005: 6; Sifuna 2006: 85). For this reason, Sifuna (2006), Otieno and Munene (2007) and Odhiambo (2011) urge the Kenyan government to revisit its education policies and legislation to address the phenomenal violence, and other disparities in policy formulation.

Deliberation and governance are also additional factors that are core to universities' roles in shaping a civilised and democratic society. Kaimenyi (2013) argues that Kenyan universities have experienced weak governance and management. This is most especially felt in the separation of powers that delinked channels for communication, hence the unrest in various sectors in university education in Kenya. Nyaigotti-Chacha (2002) notes that universities in Kenya are considered as engines of economic growth; they also play a role to liberate minds and contribute to cultivating a democratic and inclusive society. To do this, universities need to be innovative, a lack of which is detrimental to civil society's responsibility for social justice. Since independence there have been several attempts to reform education in Kenya (Chege 2009; Eshiwani 1990; Makori 2005; Maxon 1995; Muricho and Chang'ach 2013; Mwiria et al. 2007; Odhiambo 2011; Posner and Kramon 2011; Republic of Kenya 2012a;

Sifuna 2010). The reforms took the form of recommendations, commissions and policy articulation (see Republic of Kenya 1964, 1965, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1999, 2007, 2012a, b). Despite these attempts, the implementation of reformed policies has proven cumbersome and has resulted in more educational problems; for instance, the increase in ethnic conflict and political violence has led to the death of many citizens, which can be attributed partially to communicative problems (a lack of inclusive deliberation) (Posner and Kramon 2011). For this reason, the policies have not served Kenya well. Policy development in Kenya shows a trend of excluding stakeholders in policy modification (see Ball 2006:44; Republic of Kenya 1964, 1965, 1976, 1981, 1984, 1999, 2012a, b).

Equality in Kenya is an impossible reality in Kenyan higher education. In Kenya, reforms in higher education are championed by the push of declining economy, population growth and increasing sectorial competition for scarce financial resources and the neo-liberal policies that dictate policy reforms for financing higher education (Otieno and Munene 2007). This has resulted in the rapid expansion of universities, leading to the marketisation of universities as enterprises, which poses challenges and risks to students, academics and higher education institutions in Kenya, making equality necessary and yet allowing it to become impossible. Otieno and Munene (2007) note that such policy shifts threaten equity, since universities face the risks of academic capitalism, which means that universities are run more like businesses rather than paying attention to the country's needs—for instance educating critical citizens who would become participants to counter poverty, violence (war) and other ills that may hamper a peaceful society (Johnson 2013: 330).

Access to higher education institutions has proven cumbersome. The Kenyan government has attempted to equalise opportunities for higher education, but there is apprehension about disparities in access and the participation of several socio-economic groups. Endeavours to democratise access promoted by public subsidies do not seem to have had any meaningful influence on the participation levels of students from the lower end of the socio-economic scale in Kenyan higher education (Boit and Kipkoech 2012: 79; Nyaigotti-Chacha 2002). The number of students from low-income background continues to diminish in higher education. In addition, access to universities is problematic today; it is interesting to

note that access to universities in Kenya is based on how much money an individual is able to pay for access. Those who qualify have no assurance that they will have opportunities to access higher education because the economic factor has been proven to be the key determinant of entry. The question is: how just is this process when it includes some and excludes others? Who participated in making such policies that exclude? Is this policy in tandem with justice as described in the liberal strands of DCE?

Public reason is not a common practice in Kenya. The Kenyan constitution (Chapter 2, article 10) provides rights to fundamental freedoms (Republic of Kenya 2012b), specifically freedom of expression, freedom of association, academic freedom and access to justice. While public reasonableness is highlighted in the constitution, Kenyan higher education displays a lack of and limited public reasonableness (Hornsby 2012: 537; Knighton 2010: 107). If reasonableness was used by students, academics and management alike, violence would not arise, since citizens will comply with their rights and freedom of speech, and respect others' rights to life. Kenya higher education has faced a lack of academic freedom and interference by politics. The political elite silenced academics teaching public reasonableness, and students were not encouraged to question or engage in public discourses about public policy or to question political authority in Kenya (Hornsby 2012: 269). Today, with limited freedom of communication (even though the constitution provides space for academic freedom, and freedom of expression), Kenyans would rather keep quiet about their problems to maintain the peace. This has remained one of the uncontrollable issues that erupted in several instances of violence, culminating in the ethnic violence in 2007.

Implication of the Liberal DCE (Minimalist Ones) to the Challenges of Kenyan Higher Education

DCE within the minimalist stance can enable Kenyans to look beyond ethnic or national citizenship to understanding humans as world citizens, motivating multicultural relations and cooperation. The question is how can Kenyan higher education pursue this?

Higher education comprises a community of individuals who have interest in advancing education. This makes higher education a deliberative platform that offers environments for collaboration and cooperative public engagement. As such, constructive and meaningful engagement requires democratic communication in which individual voices are heard in an equal opportunity pattern. Rawls (1971) shows how respect and reciprocity exemplify democratic communication in egalitarian fairness. Higher education policies should be designed to inspire communication at all levels—be it at the macro- (policy-makers) or micro-(university classrooms) levels—to maximise learning and teaching. Communication in higher education has the capacity to enable university autonomy so that the institution can advance initiative, independence and imaginative action to construct own learning. That is to say, public expression grants citizens opportunities to hear others' feelings about formulating new thinking in education. When this is lacking in education, democracy is not cultivated in the sense of egalitarianism. Democratic communication might mean supporting ethnic politics if it means that it will provide environments for dialogue to abolish the abuse of the human right to life. The end point for democratic communication ought to be egalitarian universities in which every citizen will feel safe and secure and have a sense of belonging, despite the diversity found in these institutions.

Rawls (1971) postulates that understanding one's self is essential to how one relates with the other; this understanding sheds more light on the parochial conception of community as currently found in Kenyan higher education. Kenyan higher education policies conceptualise education (community) in nationalistic terms, which excludes one's understanding of self in relation to the other. The nationalistic understanding of education is narrow because it excludes some and includes others, for instance those who are not nationals. The other is wider than the national links that the education policy engenders. Nationalistic parochialism in the Kenyan education context explains why the divisive ethnic violence, rioting students, corruption and such vices follow such an understanding of (community) of education that excludes the other—being recognition of humanity (human being). The concept of identity and how it is understood and taught to students can influence communal relations. For instance the outcome of parochialism in understanding community edu-

cation can be explained in the event in which it reproduces irresponsible attitudes and a lack of understanding of diversity and difference—a case for the Kenyan universities. If students were to understand the richness of tribal difference, plurality and the possibilities of responsible deliberative channels, they can engage critically to encounter their differences and avoid violent occurrences, which may infringe on the rights of others.

Justice is also fundamental to conceptualising education. Rawls (1971) clarifies justice as a balanced and fair assessment of social circumstances by way of argumentation—a claim of reason to reach agreement. Put differently, Rawls views justice as a reflection of a fair system of cooperation over time, by creating a more equitable, respectful and just society for everyone. Rawls notes that such a process must be guided by the principle of the equality of citizens and of equal opportunities, and the principle of distributive justice—whereby any inequality is redressed so that everyone involved participates for the benefit of all. Rawls (1971) perceives that the process of justice needs moral values such as respect, reciprocity, cooperation and communication, without which fairness cannot be guaranteed. For Rawls, the principle of justice provides liberty and freedom for citizens to participate in building their society and securing their sense of belonging to the community, in which they are valued. What is alarming in Rawls's case is the exclusion of indifference. For instance, how can such a pluralistic and diverse community be able to deal with disagreements except by agreeing? The moment fairness is mentioned, the idea of democracy and citizenship is reduced to those who agree. What happens to those who do not agree? Must citizens always agree?

On the other hand, Rawls's idea of justice brings to the fore the purpose of education, which is that every effort should be made to ensure that all citizens enjoy fair access to education. If education exists to ensure justice for all citizens, then democratic education is a worthwhile practice for higher education to pursue. Justice as viewed by Rawls—a procedural process—is helpful when considered for policy development in education. It is also worthwhile to consider education as a process of recognising those who are marginalised by the politically elite education system so that they get the education needed to develop their capacity for critical

rationality and opportunities for deliberation. However, the notion of justice needs to extend beyond Rawls's preoccupation with justice as fairness in reaching agreement.

In ensuring justice, higher education needs to extend and capture 'opportunities for all citizens': this statement is a rhetorical one and poses the question whether all citizens are capable of accessing higher education. Specifically, in terms of access, education for justice from Rawls's perspective is rather narrow and exclusive; for instance, what about citizens who do not have the same intellectual capacity to secure a place in higher education, which espouses meritocracy, high social mobility and a variety of tastes and allegiances? However, as Ryan (1999: 43) notes, 'the idea of university in liberal education is something contrasted with vocational education—no ordinary people will have access to'. Ryan (1999: 40) suggests that an educating society is one that tries to maximise the intelligence and perceptiveness of all its citizens, not necessarily to acquire the same educational standards, but to achieve their potential and participate in innovation and the development of themselves and the society they share.

Using justice to conceptualise higher education is a worthwhile venture; however, the meaning of justice needs to be extended beyond reaching an agreement. The egalitarian notion of justice needs to capture even the moments when people do not seem to agree.

According to Habermas (1987a), to be understood by others and to understand others' opinions are ways of making the education process a just one. This is because, for him, communicative action is justice if the process facilitates learning by way of negotiating, persuading and convincing others about what we think is just. For Habermas, this process requires a language of understanding, a cultural platform for negotiation and the recognition of the 'other'. However, the question is: how many people in our society today are able to participate in deliberation? If education is conceptualised only by a real speech situation, then it might be exclusive and render itself meaningless to those who are not eloquent enough to convince others for consensus. Young (2003) offers a different understanding from Habermas's view on public reason which may strengthen public reason. Young (2003) notes that democracy entails political equality, in which case all members of the polity are included in

the decision-making process and have an equal opportunity to influence the outcome (Young 2003: 52).

According to Benhabib (2011: 151), iterations offer uncompromising accounts for political justice. This process is inclusive and deliberative, interrogates schemas and entails equal participation. Iteration implies the uniqueness of participants, demands the distribution of speech acts and takes place in overlapping communities. Iterations comprise both international and transnational organisations. They are concerned with both moral and political constitutional obligations to human rights contracts. Iterations arbitrate between collectivities that depict our sense of belonging and institutional duties, and the setting beyond universal human rights and justice to which such a collectivity ought to be distributed equally. Iterations should not be constrained by majority politics or prescribed law-making processes.

Benhabib (2011) moves away from limiting conversations to local communities (an aspect begun by Nussbaum) and introduces the idea of talking back to each other over and over. In this sense, when deliberation takes place in the first instance, certain agreements are reached; however, the exclusion of other voices may prompt disagreements in further discourses and, as such, reflexivity is necessary to identify decisions in conflicts that discomfort others so that iterations are provoked by those discomforted by the previous decisions. This process is a circular one, until every human need is fulfilled. Benhabib (2011) says that despite the fact that nation-states are limiting such discussions, it is the context in which such discourses should begin. They then should transcend borders in relation to international discourse, such as that on human rights in what she calls 'cosmopolitanism without illusion', an account she contextualised in relation to human rights in troubled times. In this context, Benhabib unravels the conflicts that prevail concerning a conceptualisation of human rights that has limited a utopian understanding, and hence descends into conflictive human experiences of war and tension. Benhabib calls for a human right that protects human dignity, without boundaries of where the human being is from. In other words, the human right to dignity and right to life are worth protecting and require iterative discourses to formulate a plausible and universal protection of human rights.

Borrowing Benhabib's (2011) notion of iteration, it can be said that democratic education in Kenyan higher education ought to create spaces for stakeholders to participate in addressing societal needs and the protection of human rights. Benhabib's thinking informs higher education in Kenya, especially her notion of talking back as a way of reflective thinking in the construction of education. Currently taking place in Kenya is the devolution of governance. This process requires iterations on history and the understanding of education policies, and of the political and current needs of Kenyan citizens. However, I do not want to delve into the concept of devolution, but rather stay focused on Kenyan higher education.

In Benhabibian terms, education will be engendered as a process of talking back to each other in the moral sense of respecting another's communicative freedom by virtue of our humanity. In this sense, we can participate in formulating the kind of higher education that will be relevant to the needs of our society, which will reflect a citizenry we perceive and imagine.

In the next section, I argue that liberal democratic strands (analysed in Habermas, Rawls and Benhabib) are helpful starting points for thinking about education; however, they portray thin and limited thoughts for conceptualising education that will help Kenya to deal with the ever-changing terrain of society and overcome the challenges experienced by education in Kenya. This can be stated on the basis of the analysis in the previous sections, which highlight the flaws of such thinking for Kenyan higher education. In the section that follows, I analyse DCE in becoming as a tenable conception that can constantly help us think differently and provide us with nuances to make meaning of education to challenge the ever-growing challenges.

On the Potentiality of Democratic Citizenship Education in Becoming: Lessons for Kenyan Higher Education

In this section I argue that liberal democratic education in the minimalist view is thin and insufficient to address the anomalies and imbalance in the Kenyan Education system. This is because most of their understandings

are already actualised in the Country's education policies. Thus, DCE in becoming as an extension of a liberal DCE can provide potentials that can address the challenges Kenya faces. Therefore, this section argues that an extended view of DCE can contribute towards cultivating non-coercive and non-violent society—if people are initiated into such discourses they can positively influence societal development. In addition, a liberal view of DCE is insufficient to address the flaw and challenges society and within education policy texts; therefore, my argument is to extend the view to what is still in becoming. It is about what can still potentially happen.

Liberal DCE can be extended to DCE in becoming as a way of thinking differently from the liberal ideas discussed previously. This potentially can act as a disruption of the liberal notions that are found in Kenyan DCE. In this way of thinking DCE is viewed in its potentiality and not achievability/actuality that potentially can address the challenges Kenya face. From Agamben's (1993) perspective, DCE holds certain potentialities that can determine its actuality, and at the same time manifest potentialities that can end in itself and never pass into actuality—'it saves itself of actuality' (Waghid 2013: 23). This demands further curiosity about what is absent (signified when a concept fails to manifest actuality of its meaning) about the conceptualisation of DCE in Kenya. In other words, DCE has been found in the Kenyan education system to be a concept that is made by the same people who use it, and as such depicts an obsession with the consumerist sense of its meaning, hence the lack of effort to inquire further into the potentialities that will sustain DCE as a becoming concept (with its sustainable potentialities) to constantly deal with the challenges of educating for democratic citizenship. In keeping with Agamben's (1993) seminal thought on *The Coming Community*, DCE is in becoming and is always unpredictable, yet it holds potentialities to counter the anomalies and imbalances in the Kenyan education system. Thus, DCE lies in a state of becoming and not of attainment (Waghid 2014: 41). Moreover, DCE in becoming portrays potentialities in a language and communication that are necessary for human experience (education). Accordingly, human experience needs to be framed in a language that disengages predictability, thereby enabling endless learning; such learning is considered durable (Waghid 2014: 41).

From the aforementioned, DCE in becoming breaks away from predetermined outcomes in education and brings people together as a matter of engaging—not to determine the actuality of ideas as such, but to find potentialities of meaning for human experience (education). This kind of engaging in communities creates potential for a sense of belonging determined by whatever results come from such an engagement. In this sense of understanding democratic education, communication does not determine what DCE becomes, but determines what DCE is becoming. This differs from the liberal understanding of both Habermas and Rawls, who posit consensus in deliberation as an actuality. In the same manner, it shows that justice has the potential for fairness (from Rawls's perspective), and that when its fairness becomes unfair, it becomes fairness in becoming (an Agamben/Derridian perspective)—justice in becoming. In the same manner, justice is constantly in becoming. In addition, Benhabibian iterations manifest the potential for reflexivity and talking back, as is necessary for human rights in becoming, and when it becomes, its [im] potentialities demand continuous iterations in becoming on human rights. Waghid (2014: 4) notes that, iteration in Benhabibian view does not necessarily substantiate how such iterations should be conducted. However, he notes that iteration may mean that participants in a deliberation are given the opportunity to say things again and again. He indicates that such a view of iterations (talking over and over) may not provoke participants to think differently or see things a new. In this sense, iterations should be in such a way that it evokes new potentialities for DCE in becoming.

In the same light, DCE in Kenya is demonstrated in the tensions between civic citizenship and ethnic citizenship. Civic citizenship in Kenya shows potentialities in education policy, inter alia national unity, national development, freedom, the right to economic resources, equality, social justice and the right to education, as portrayed in the country's liberal policy documents (Republic of Kenya 2012b). However, the impotentialities of the liberal outcomes of the policy documents suggest predetermined policy stipulations that are not achievable and cannot meet or address Kenyan problems (dual loyalties to citizenship in Kenya). This is because, in Kenya, one has two or more identities to reckon with—keeping tribal citizenship and at the same time observing civic citizenship, which means that national citizenship is controlled by civic

laws and ethnic citizenship is tamed by tribal loyalties. To contend with such complexity, citizenship education in Kenya requires reconsideration. This reconsideration, I contend, entails viewing Kenyans first as human beings before noting their national loyalties. I believe that the commonalities Kenyans share provide ample space for constant dialogue on reconstructing DCE that could help Kenya deal with the loyalties to nationalism and ethnicity. In this case, nationalism only is a potential sense of belonging; it is not an actual sense of belonging, for if it is, as proposed in Kenyan higher education policies, it ceases to have potential. This is why the challenges (impotentialities) Kenyan education experiences pushes for a constant search for innovative possibilities (potentialities) to constantly address such challenges. Thereby, enabling Kenya higher education to re-imagine how human dignity and democratic practices can be constantly constructed. The impotentiality of actualising DCE in nationalistic terms portrays its potentialities and denies its actuality, hence the need for a constant search for meaning in Kenyan higher education to deal with the imbalances in Kenyan society. It is safe, therefore, for Kenya to think of DCE in terms of becoming.

This suggests that Kenyan education policy is in becoming, since it has not resolved the ethnic violence, poverty, disease and corruption in the country. Ethnic citizenship recognises one's right to belong to a particular ethnic/tribal group, with loyalty to what the group demands. Such thinking depicts the possibility that ethnic citizenship holds for Kenyan higher education and suggests that it is in becoming (in the making). However, the impotentialities that ethnic citizenship displays in ethnic conflicts and post-election violence in the country suggest the absence and inadequacy of the liberal view of DCE in the Kenyan higher education system. In this sense, DCE in Kenya is in becoming. Re-imagining DCE in Kenya demands that DCE be viewed within potentialities and impotentialities so that education can become durable DCE in becoming.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that DCE in Kenya demands a re-imagining of citizenship education that transcends the boundaries of possibilities and impossibilities in order to enhance education as a process of becoming

in relation to human experience, interactions and/or with ethnic relations. Since ethnic rights have the potential to influence the development that the country predetermines in policy documents, it could be viewed as being in a stage of infancy and having the potential to solve higher education problems. A reconsidered notion of DCE in becoming has the potential that can enable Kenyan policy-makers, educators and students to think and speak differently and to suspend quick judgement about how policies, power and decision in education are made.

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